TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

VResArc: Progress-Difficulty Emission
with a Protocol-Owned Liquidity Reserve.

CLASS: Fair-launch utilityNETWORK: Arc (native-USDC L1)

§0Notation

Throughout, b ∈ ℕ₀ denotes the global emission counter (blockCount); all balances are denominated in 18-decimal VRES wei unless stated; native-USDC quantities are likewise 18-decimal.

H(x) = keccak256(x) · ‖ ≡ abi.encodePacked concat
target(b) = (2256 − 1) >> (20 + ⌊b / 1,200⌋)
stage(b) = ⌊b / 1,200⌋   ω(b) = 10,000 × 2−stage(b)  VRES

§1Positioning Statement

VResArc is a single-entry, zero-overhead emission primitive deployed on the Arc network. The contract exposes exactly one state-transition surface — mine(nonce) — whose acceptance predicate is a partial-order test over the digest space of keccak-256. Accepted transitions mint against a pre-committed, monotone, time-invariant reward schedule.

The issuance ledger is partitioned at genesis into two disjoint pools: (i) a miner-accessible emission pool (≈75%) governed by the difficulty schedule below, and (ii) a protocol-owned liquidity reserve (25%) minted in a single genesis event to a dedicated vault destination, reserved exclusively for the post-mint liquidity bootstrap. The structure admits no third bucket — no team allocation, no presale tranche, no advisor grant, no treasury vote.

It is a distribution machine, not a consensus network. This document does not claim otherwise.

§2Genesis & Distribution Profile

BucketShareQuantity (VRES)Custody & binding
PoW Emission Pool≈74.9998%≈23,999,755.86programmatic — 20,000 blocks, difficulty-gated, miner-claimable
POL Reserve≈25.0002%8,000,000genesis-minted → LP vault · single-purpose
Team / Presale / Advisor0%structurally absent
hardCap = Σb<20,000 ω(b) + POL_alloc  =  31,999,755,859,375,000,000,000,000 wei
total ≈ 31,999,755.86 VRES ≈ 32,000,000 (nominal)

At deployment the constructor performs a single irreversible mint to the vault destination (LP_VAULT), emitting Transfer(address(0), LP_VAULT, 8e24). The emission pool thereafter is reachable exclusively through the proof-of-work gate; no minting entry exists outside mine().

§3Emission Schedule

The mining window spans 20,000 blocks. Within each epoch of 1,200 blocks the per-block reward is constant; across epoch boundaries it decays geometrically with ratio ½:

epochblock intervalreward/blockepoch supplydifficulty
00 – 1,19910,00012,000,0002^20
11,200 – 2,3995,0006,000,0002^21
22,400 – 3,5992,5003,000,0002^22
1619,200 – 19,9990.1526…122.072^36

The cap is computed, not asserted: the constructor accumulates per-epoch issuance over the actual block schedule — including the truncated terminal epoch — such that MAX_SUPPLY is, by construction, equal to the supremum the machine can ever emit. No governance patch, no approximation error, no re-base.

Front-loaded issuance. Because decay is geometric with epoch length 1,200, the first epoch alone distributes 50% of total supply at the minimum difficulty — a deliberate design property colloquially termed the supply cliff. By block 10,800 (54% of the window) ≈99.8% of supply has cleared the gate.

§4The Proof-of-Work Gate

Mining reduces to an offline search over a 84-byte namespace:

accept ⇔ H( miner ‖ b ‖ nonce ) < target(b)

The acceptance threshold is recomputed at execution time from the live counter — the EVM re-derives target(blockCount) inside every call frame, so stale or fabricated proofs revert atomically with the block, wasting only gas; the mint ticket itself is never at risk of partial consumption. As blockCount is a monotone global serial counter, the state space is fork-free and double-spend-free by construction; competition collapses to a Poisson race whose sole manipulable surface is a one-block mempool-ordering window.

Time-invariance of the scheduler

The scheduler is a pure function of block progress. It ingests no oracle, no wall-clock timestamp, and no network-hashrate telemetry — rendering clock games, difficulty-adjustment griefing and time-warp attacks structurally inapplicable. Aggregate hashpower entering or leaving the system cannot relax the schedule; it can only accelerate progress toward the cliff and the terminal 2^36 regime.

§5Protocol-Owned Liquidity Reserve (25%)

8,000,000 VRES are minted once, at genesis, to LP_VAULT. The reserve exists to answer a structural defect of hash-launches: a fully mined token with no trading depth is a token without a market. The POL tranche is the counterweight — it remains vaulted across the entire mining window and migrates into pool depth only after the terminal block.

PropertyBinding
Mint eventsingle genesis mint · one-time · observable in the deployment tx
Destinationimmutable vault address (constructor-fixed)
Unlock schedulenone — no vesting, no linear-release tranches
Disbursementone intended action: VRES/USDC depth at the post-mint liquidity migration
Reallocationnot provisioned

The token layer does not impersonate a treasury. Contract-level custody is deliberately minimal: a single immutable destination and a genesis-only mint. Downstream disbursement is a one-time, fully transparent on-chain event by design — the commitment is structural, and the ledger stays silent on intent beyond that. A nominal fraction of the terminal supply remains provisioned against downstream protocol utilities — beyond markets, and specified only after the final block.

§6Immutability & Security Posture

All economic constants — TOTAL_BLOCKS, INITIAL_REWARD, HALVING_BLOCKS, DIFFICULTY_STEP, POL_ALLOC, BASE_TARGET, MINT_FEE, FEE_RECEIVER, LP_VAULT — are constant/immutable and fixed at construction. The contract carries no owner field, no pausable gate, no proxy, no upgrade path, and no secondary mint. ERC-20 semantics (approve/transferFrom) are implemented natively; mint events surface as canonical Transfer(address(0), ·, ·) records, keeping the ledger composable with standard indexers and DeFi rails.

§7Auditability

The contract is a single, dependency-free source file; the complete test matrix (emission math, difficulty–reward linkage via state mutation, ERC-20 semantics, genesis POL mint, fee/low-nonce reverts) passes against Foundry. Exact constants, selectors and schedule tables are enumerated above; any discrepancy between this specification and the deployed bytecode is, by construction, a spec bug, not a contract bug.